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SELL v. UNITED STATES: IS COMPETENCY
ENOUGH TO FORCIBLY MEDICATE A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT?
Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Sell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court found that
the Constitution allows for governmental administration of antipsychotic
drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to render
the defendant competent to stand trial for nonviolent but serious crimes, in
limited circumstances.' The Supreme Court examined whether the forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent to
stand trial is constitutional, specifically whether the defendant was deprived
of an important "liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 2 The Court
vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision upholding the decision of the District
Court allowing the administration of antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a
mentally ill patient.'
This Note criticizes the decision in Sell in light of the precedents set
forth in Harper4 and Riggins.5 The Court should have completely
prohibited involuntary medication of a mentally ill criminal defendant with
antipsychotic drugs solely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.
An individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest to be free from
any unwanted bodily intrusion that will override a state's interest in
bringing a defendant to trial. The decision was wrong because a criminal
defendant also has a constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial that is
undermined by forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs due to their
significant and harmful side effects. Furthermore, Sell's crimes were not
serious enough to warrant forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs,
assuming that forcible administration of medication should be allowed at
123 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2003).

2 Id. at 2174.

Id. at 2181.

4 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

5 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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all. Finally, the dissent by Justice Scalia will be criticized for its failure to
adhere to the collateral order doctrine and its narrow interpretation of the
final judgment rule, thereby depriving a criminal defendant of his right to a
fair trial.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION

Two broad general categories of antipsychotic drugs exist: the older
"conventional" drugs, and the more recently developed "atypical" drugs. 6
Common side effects of conventional antipsychotic drugs include
extrapyramidal reactions along with the extremely serious tardive
dyskinesia.7 Extrapyramidal reactions can include nervous ticks, tremors,
spasms, and the need to be in constant motion. These reactions have been
found to occur in fifty to seventy-five percent of patients treated with
conventional antipsychotic drugs. 8 Tardive dyskinesia is a vicious form of
an extrapyramidal reaction and is characterized by involuntary and jerky
movement of the facial and oral muscles, along with the upper and lower
extremities and trunk. 9 Furthermore, the seriousness of this condition is
demonstrated by the fact that it often manifests itself after treatment with
the antipsychotic drugs has ceased and is potentially irreversible.' 0 Even
the Supreme Court has observed that the proportion of patients treated with
antipsychotic drugs who exhibit the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia ranges
from ten to twenty-five percent."
In addition to these extrapyramidal
reactions, conventional antipsychotic drugs can often produce other harmful
side effects such as sedation, interference with an individual's
concentration, blurred vision, dry 2mouth and throat, constipation, urine
retention, weakness, and dizziness.1
The newer "atypical" antipsychotic drugs have been reported to have a3
more favorable side effect profile than conventional antipsychotic drugs.'
6 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 20, Sell v. United
States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
7 Id. Extrapyramidal reactions are a family of neurological disorders that can cause
muscular rigidity, resting tremors, motor retardation, a need to be in constant motion, and
severe spasms of the head and neck muscles. Id. at 20 n.18.
8 Id. at 20-21.
9 Id. at 20 n.18.
10 Id.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990).
12Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 21, Sell (No. 02'1

5664).
13 Id. at 22.
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The American Psychiatric Association noted that major progress had been
made, particularly in reducing the traditionally most troublesome side
effects through the introduction of the newer atypical medications in the last
decade. 14 However, these atypical antipsychotic drugs have their own side
effects. 15 These side effects can include the potentially fatal disappearance
of white blood cells, extrapyramidal effects, cataracts, heart rhythm
irregularities, sedation, seizures, hypotension, and weight gain., 6 It should
also be noted that due to the relatively short time period that these atypical
antipsychotic drugs have been in use, there may still7 be some latedeveloping side effects that have not yet been discovered.1
Until very recently, only conventional antipsychotic drugs had been
approved for intramuscular injection, and as a result these were the only
drugs available for involuntary administration.' 8
Consequently,
conventional antipsychotics, with their more harmful side effects, were the
drugs used to forcibly medicate a criminal defendant.19 However, one
atypical drug, ziprasidone, was recently approved for intramuscular
injection, and it has a much more favorable side effect profile than the
conventional antipsychotic drugs.2 ° Potentially, this could significantly
alter a trial court's analysis of forcible administration of antipsychotic
medication, but as these drugs are still new there needs to be more clinical
data available in order for a court to consider atypical drugs free from
serious side effects, 2'
In sum, antipsychotic drugs cover a wide array of medications, each
producing different and serious side effects. These drugs have different
physical and chemical properties and potential side effects and are effective
for treating a wide range of specific mental disorders.22 These drugs are not
"panaceas" and a court should take into consideration all these factors when
determining their effectiveness in rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial.23
14 Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry

and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-18, Sell (No. 02-5664)
[hereinafter Brief for the American Psychiatric Association].
15Id.
16 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 22-23, Sell (No. 025664).
17 Id. at 23.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at
21

24.

Id.

22 Id.
23

See id. at 24-25.
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B. THE LAW PRIOR TO SELL

The law in the area of forcible administration of antipsychotic
medication to individuals generally fell into two categories: that of
defendants awaiting trial,24 and that of inmates already convicted.2 5 To
forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a defendant awaiting trial,
the governmental interests must have outweighed the interests of the
defendant.26 Similarly, the interests of the government must outweigh the
liberty interests of an inmate to allow the forcible administration of
antipsychotic medication.27 Prior to Sell the Court had never dealt with the
issue of forcible medication solely to render a defendant competent to stand
trial. The law had focused on the issue of dangerousness to one's self and
to others as the reason for administration of the drugs.28
The Supreme Court first examined the forcible administration of
prison inmates in Washington v. Harper.29 The Court concluded that the
Due Process Clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the
inmate is found to be dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in
the inmate's best medical interest. 30 In Harper, the Court considered a
Washington state policy that authorized forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs to mentally ill inmates who are gravely disabled or who
represent a significant danger to themselves or others. 3 1 The Court held that
an individual has a significant constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.32 That liberty
interest, however, is subject to state concerns as well.33 The governmental
interest in forcibly administering the medication was found to be both
legitimate and important. 34 The Court found the state regulation permitting
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to an inmate to be
permissible under the Constitution.35 The regulation was found to be an
"accommodation" between the inmate's liberty interest and the State's
24
25

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

26 Hollybeth G. Hakes, Annotation, Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medication

to PretrialDetainees-FederalCases, 188 A.L.R. FED. 285, 285 (2003).
27 See Harper,494 U.S. 210.
28 See id.; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127.
29 Harper,494 U.S. at 210.
30 Id. at 227.
3' Id. at 226.
32 Id. at 221.
3

Id. at 222-23.

14 Id. at 225.
35 Id. at 236.
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interest in reducing the danger a mentally ill inmate may pose to himself or
others.36
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority
undervalued Harper's liberty interest.3 7 His argument centered on the
different dimensions of a person's liberty interest. 38 A violation of a
person's bodily integrity is an invasion of that person's liberty.3 9 Justice
Stevens stated that the liberty of citizens to resist the involuntary
administration of mind-altering drugs is rooted in the Nation's "most basic
values. 4 ° He also focused on the dangerous side effects of these
antipsychotic drugs and the fact that they can be both irreversible and
fatal. 4 ' He found that a competent individual's right to refuse antipsychotic
medication is a fundamental liberty interest demanding the highest possible
level of protection.4 2
Justice Stevens also argued that the state regulation "sweepingly
sacrifices the inmate's substantive liberty interest . . . to institutional and
administrative concerns. 43 While he admitted that security concerns were
a legitimate state interest, he concluded that the regulation allowing prison
administrators to address these concerns by forcibly administering
psychotropic drugs to mentally ill inmates for prolonged periods was
without a doubt an "exaggerated response" to those concerns.44 This
contention went to Justice Stevens' main point: the forcible administration
of drugs solely to suppress an inmate's potential for violence, rather than to
achieve therapeutic results, should not be considered on its own. 45 This
reasoning results in a "muddled rationale" that allows the forced
administration of psychotropic medication solely on the basis of
institutional concerns, and consequently "eviscerates the inmate's
46
substantive liberty interest in the integrity of his body and mind.,

36

Id. The Court found that the essential procedural requirements of the Due Process

Clause were embodied in the state regulation.
37 Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the liberty interests as being both physical and
intellectual).
39 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 238 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(relying on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.")).
41 Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 245-46 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
44 Id. at 247 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
45 Id. at 248-49 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
46 Id. at 249-50 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court reiterated that an individual has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest to avoid involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication.4 7 Riggins differed from Harper
in that it involved the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a
defendant in a criminal trial as opposed to a prison inmate.48 The Court, in
an opinion by Justice O'Connor, overturned Riggins' conviction and relied
on Harper's holding that the state must show an essential state policy
interest, and the interest must be both legitimate and important enough to
overcome the defendant's liberty interest. 49 The Riggins Court suggested
that forced medication of a defendant in order to render him competent to
stand trial might be constitutionally permissible, if the prosecution
demonstrated that the treatment was medically appropriate and necessary
for the safety of the defendant or the safety of others. 50 Consequently, once
Riggins moved for termination of his medication during trial, the court was
obligated to establish the need for antipsychotic medication and the medical
appropriateness of such medication. 51 The record before the Court did not
clearly indicate a finding that safety considerations or any other compelling
concerns outweighed Riggins' liberty interest in being free from unwanted
antipsychotic drugs.5 2 Thus, the Court concluded that the trial court's error
might well have impaired the constitutionally protected trial rights invoked
by Riggins.5 3
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Riggins, cited by the Court in
Sell, focused on the possible side effects of antipsychotic drugs and their
potential interference with a defendant's ability to receive a fair trial.54 He
stated that, absent an extraordinary showing by the state, the Due Process
Clause prohibits the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs55
solely for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.
He also expressed doubt that the showing could be made due to the present
understanding of the drugs' properties.56

47 504 U.S. 127, 133-34 (1992).

" See id. at 129-33.
49 Id. at 137-38.

'0 Id. at 135.
51Id. (noting that the district court failed in its obligation).
52 Id. at 136.
" Id. at 137.
54 Id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (relying on the medical and pharmacological
data presented in the amicus briefs).
55 Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy also went further than the majority and directly
57
addressed the issue of a defendant's competence to stand trial.
Competence is a legitimate state interest drawn from the state's right to
bring an accused to trial and from Pate v. Robinson,58 which held that
conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process. 59 In a clear
foreshadowing of the issue in Sell, Kennedy questioned whether the state's
interest in bringing the accused to trial allows it to secure the defendant's
competence through involuntary medication. Kennedy further argued that
the state must, in every case, make a showing that the medication being
forcibly administered will not pose a significant risk of impairing or altering
the defendant's ability to react to testimony and assist counsel.6 Justice
Kennedy concluded that if the state is unable to "render the defendant
competent without involuntary medication, then it must resort to civil
commitment. 62 Justice Kennedy believed that the Constitution requires
that society
bear such a cost "in order to preserve the integrity of the trial
63
process."
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
The defendant, Doctor Charles Sell, a practicing dentist, had a long
history of mental illness. He was first hospitalized for mental illness in
1982, after telling doctors that the gold he used for fillings had been
contaminated by communists. 64 He was again hospitalized in June of 1984
after calling the police and reporting he saw a leopard board a bus.65 In
April of 1997 he told law enforcement personnel that God spoke to him and
said that for every Federal Bureau of Investigation agent he killed, a soul
would be saved.6 6

57 Id. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

" 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
59 Id.
60 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (assuming there is a sound
medical basis for treatment).
61 Id. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64 Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2003).
65 Id.
66 id.
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On May 16, 1997, the Government charged Sell with submitting
fictitious insurance claims for payment, under 18 U.S.C. § 1035.67 The
government filed a motion for a psychiatric examination of Dr. Sell to
determine his competence to stand trial. 6 8 He was sent to the U.S. Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners for an evaluation. 69 After receiving a
psychological evaluation from the center, a federal magistrate judge found
Sell "currently competent" to stand trial.
On November 6, 1997, a grand jury produced a superseding indictment
charging Sell and his wife with "fifty-six counts of mail fraud, . . . six

counts of Medicaid fraud, . . . and one count of money laundering., 71 In
early 1998 the Government claimed that Sell attempted to intimidate a
witness and a bail revocation hearing was held.7 2 Based on Sell's "out of
control" 73 behavior, which included screaming, shouting, using racial
epithets, and spitting in the magistrate's face, the magistrate revoked bail.74
A second grand jury indicted Sell on April 23, 1998, charging him and
his wife with conspiring to murder an FBI agent and a former employee
who planned to testify against him in the fraud case.75 The attempted
murder and fraud cases were then joined for trial.7 6
In February of 1999, Sell moved for another hearing to reevaluate his
competence to stand trial.77 The magistrate sent Sell back to the U.S.
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, for another
competency examination. 78 After the magistrate received the psychological
evaluation on April 14, 1999, he found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Sell was suffering from a mental disease that rendered him mentally
incompetent to stand trial. 79 The magistrate ordered Sell hospitalized to
determine whether there was a substantial probability that Sell would attain
the capacity to allow the trial to go forward.80
67 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2) (2004). Specifically, Sell was charged with submitting "false
statements relating to health care matters."
68 Brief for the United States at 2, Sell (No. 02-5664).
69 Id.
70 id.
71 Id.

72 Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2179.

73 United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002).
74 Brief for the United States at 3 n. 1, Sell (No. 02-5664).
71 Id. at 2.
76 Id. at 2-3.
77 Id. at 3.
78 Id.
79 id.
8o Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2003).
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A reviewing psychiatrist held a hearing in June of 1999 and concluded
that antipsychotic medication was required to restore Sell to competence to
stand trial. 8' At the hearing, both of Sell's treating psychiatrists testified
that antipsychotic medication was the only way to restore Sell to
competency. 82 Sell presented an affidavit from his psychiatrist who stated
that he believed Sell would not respond well to medication. 83 He also
presented witnesses who testified that Sell did not want to take
antipsychotic medication and "have his chemistry altered. 84 On July 12,
1999, a Bureau of Prisons reviewing official found that antipsychotic
medication was the treatment most likely to ameliorate Sell's symptoms
and that other less restrictive treatments would likely be ineffective. 85 The
official consequently upheld the decision of the hearing officer that Sell
would benefit from antipsychotic medication.86
The magistrate held a hearing on September 29, 1999, to rule on Sell's
motion contesting the Medical Center's right to involuntarily administer the
antipsychotic medication.8 7 The evidence presented was the same as that in
the administrative hearing, with the addition of an incident that had taken
place at the Medical Center after the administrative hearing. 88 The incident
involved Sell professing his love for a nurse and displaying inappropriate
behavior. 89 This "boundary-breaching" behavior was considered "not
harmless" by the medical staff and consequently Sell was moved to a
locked cell. 90
In August of 2000, the magistrate found that Sell was a danger to
himself and others and that the Government had shown that the medication
was the only way to render Sell harmless to himself and others and
competent to stand trial. 9' The magistrate, therefore, authorized the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, but stayed the order to
92
allow Sell to appeal to the federal district court.

81
82

Brief for the United States at 5, Sell (No. 02-5664).
United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002).

83 Id.
84 Id.
85

Sell, 123 S.Ct. at 2180.

86

Id.

87 Id.
88
89

Id.
Id.

90 Id.

9'Id. at 2181.
92

Id.
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B. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
In April of 2001, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
issued an opinion that found the magistrate's dangerous finding clearly
erroneous. 93 The court noted that Sell's behavior was at most an
"inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation" with a nurse. 94 This finding
of Sell's non-dangerousness was made after he had been returned to the
open population, was limited to Sell's dangerousness to himself and those
around him in the institutional setting, and applied only to the present time
of the ruling. 95 However, the district court affirmed the order authorizing
involuntary medication of the drugs because they represented "the only
viable hope of rendering [Dr. Sell] competent to stand trial. 96 The district
court held that the government's compelling interest in restoring Sell to
competency in order to obtain an adjudication of Sell's guilt or innocence
97
was, by itself, sufficient to justify involuntary medication.
C. EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Sell subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.98 Sell contended that the district court erred in holding that he
could be forcibly injected with antipsychotic drugs solely to render him
competent to stand trial. 99 The government argued that the district court did
not err on those grounds, yet its decision finding Sell not dangerous was
erroneous and thus provided alternate grounds for affirmance of the district
court's decision. °°
In March 2002, a divided panel affirmed the district court's
decision. 01 They agreed that Sell was not dangerous, citing the fact that the
evidence did not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or
02
others at the Medical Center.'
The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the order of the district court allowing
forcible injection of antipsychotic medication to render Sell competent to
stand trial. 0 3 The court held that in order for the government to involuntary
93 United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 2002).
94 Id.
9' 123
96
97

S.Ct. at 2181.
Brief for the United States at 8, Sell (No. 02-5664).
Sell, 282 F.3d at 565.

98 Id. at 560.
99 Id. at 565.
1oo Id.

'o'Id. at 572.
112 Id. at 565.
103 Id. at 572.
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medicate an individual it must show three things: (1) an essential state
interest that outweighs an individual's interest in remaining free from
medication; (2) that there is no less intrusive manner of fulfilling
its
04
essential interest; and (3) that the medication is medically appropriate.
The court first focused on the essential state interest and held that the
sixty-two charges of fraud and the single charge of money laundering were
serious and that the government's interest in restoring his competency so
that he could be brought to trial was paramount.'0 5 The court next
examined whether or not there were less intrusive means by which the
government could achieve its essential interest.10 6 The court looked at the
testimony of Sell's two government-appointed psychiatrists, who stated that
antipsychotic medication was the only method to render Sell competent to
stand trial, and it looked at the affidavit presented by Sell's own
psychiatrist, which did not suggest any alternative means of restoring
competency.10 7 The court found that there were
no less intrusive means of
08
meeting the government's essential interest.
Finally, the court looked to whether or not the medication was
medically appropriate for Sell's treatment. 0 9 The court found that there
was a sufficient likelihood that antipsychotic medication would restore Sell
to competence." 0 It found that the medication could reasonably be
expected to reduce Sell's delusions and render him competent to stand trial,
that the treating doctors would be able to reduce the incidence of unpleasant
and harmful side effects caused by the drugs, and that the medical benefits
outweighed the risks normally associated with antipsychotic medication."'
The dissent, by Judge Bye, argued that the charges against Dr. Sell
were not "sufficiently serious" enough to forcibly inject him with
antipsychotic drugs on the chance they would make him competent to stand
trial." 2 Judge Bye reasoned that the charges were nonviolent and purely
economic and as such there was no identifiable victim; only society's
interest was harmed." 3 Judge Bye also attacked the majority's analysis of
the seriousness of the charges." 4 It is not the number of counts that
"oId. at 57 1.
1o5Id. at 568 (focusing only on the fraud charges).
106 Id.
107

Id.

108 Id.

'09 Id. at 568-69.
110 Id. at 570.
112
113
114

Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 572-73 (Bye, J., dissenting).
Id. at 573 (Bye, J., dissenting).
Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
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determines the sentence, but the total dollar value of the fraud, and as a
consequence if Sell were found guilty he would have faced a range of
sentencing from thirty-three to forty-one months.' 15 He concluded that the
charges were not serious enough to warrant forced medication of the
pre-trial detainee "cloaked with the
defendant who was a non-dangerous
' 16
presumption of innocence."'
D. SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI
Dr. Sell then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Eighth Circuit erred in rejecting Sell's argument that
involuntarily medicating him solely to render him competent to stand trial
for non-violent criminal offenses violated the Constitution by depriving him
of "liberty" as expressed in the 5th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.' 17
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court held that the government does have a
constitutionally permissible right to involuntarily administer antipsychotic
drugs to a mentally ill defendant." 8 However, the Court overturned the
Eighth Circuit's decision allowing forced administration of antipsychotic
medication to Charles Sell and remanded the case for further
proceedings."19 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer' 20 concluded that
the government failed to meet its burden stemming from the test created in
Harper and Riggins and consequently could not administer antipsychotic
2
drugs to Sell involuntarily solely to render him competent to stand trial.1 '

115 Id. (Bye,

J., dissenting).

116 Id. at 574 (Bye, J., dissenting).

123 S. Ct. at 2181.
I1 at 2184-85.
Id.
" Id. at 2187.
120 Joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.
2' 123 S. Ct. at 2187. The Court also held that the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction over
''t Sell,

the appeal as it was a proper "collateral order" as held in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 468 (1978). Id. at 2182-83. The Court found that the question presented in this
case, whether Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medication in part because it might make
the trial unfair, differed from the question of whether forced medication did make a trial
unfair. Id. An ordinary appeal after the trial would come too late to answer the question
presented in this case. Id. at 2183.
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The Court relied on Washington v. Harper122 and Riggins v. Nevada123 to
provide the legal framework in this case.12 4 The Court summarized these
two cases by stating:
Harper and Riggins indicate that the Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but
only if treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects
that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive
alternatives is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related
interests. 125

When a trial court must examine the question of trial competency it should
ask whether the government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the
possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness, has shown that the
need for that treatment is sufficiently 26important to overcome the
individual's protected interest in refusing it.'
The first thing a court must examine is whether the government has
"important" interests at stake in the trial.'2 7 The Court stated that the
government has an important interest in bringing to trial an individual
accused of a serious crime, whether it is a serious crime against a person or
property. 28 However, courts must also consider the facts specific to the
individual case in that they may lessen the government's important
interest. 29 Most important, the Court found, was that the government has
"a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the
30
defendant's trial is a fair one."'1
Second, the trial court must conclude that forcible medication will
significantly further the concomitant state interests. '31 The court must first
find that the drugs will be substantially likely to render the defendant
competent to stand trial, and it must also find that the drugs will be unlikely

122

494 U.S. 210 (1990).

123 504 U.S. 127 (1992).

124 123 S. Ct. at 2183-84.

Id. at 2184.
Id. at 2186.
1217Id. at 2184.
125

126

128Id.
129

Id. The Court gave the example of a defendant's failure to take drugs voluntarily,

resulting in lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill, which would reduce
the "risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a
serious crime." Id.
13oid.
131 Id.
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to have serious side
effects that will interfere with the defendant' ability to
2
assist in the trial. 13

Third, the trial court has to conclude that the forcible administration of
the antipsychotic drugs is necessary to further the government's essential
interests.1 33 Any alternative, less intrusive measures must be found unlikely
to achieve substantially similar results.' 34 Justice Breyer also pointed out
that the trial court must consider less intrusive means for35administering the
drugs, once that course of action has been decided upon.'
Fourth, the trial court must find that the administration of antipsychotic
drugs is medically appropriate and in the best medical interest of the
defendant. 36 The Court suggested that the specific type of drugs used
might come into 37consideration, because of their different levels of success
and side effects.

The Court emphasized that these standards are to be used when a trial
court is trying to decide whether involuntary administration of the
medication is necessary to further the government's interest in rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial. 38 In doing so, the Court narrowed its
holding in the case by saying that a trial court need not consider whether to
allow forced medication for competency purposes if forced medication is
39
warranted for a different purpose, such as an individual's dangerousness.
The Court stated that there are often persuasive reasons for a court to
determine whether involuntary medication is justified on alternative
grounds before examining the trial competence question. 40 Consequently,
if the authorization of involuntary medication is made on alternative
grounds then the need to consider medication in order to render a defendant
competent to stand trial disappears. 14 1 The Court concluded that when a
court is asked to authorize involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs
in order to render a defendant competent to stand trial it should ordinarily
determine whether the government sought permission for forced

132

Id. at 2184-85.

' Id. at 2185.
134

Id. (relying on amicus briefs for both the American Psychological Association and the

American Psychiatric Association, coming to opposite conclusions on the efficacy of
antipsychotic medication).
135 Id.
136 Id.

137 Id.
138 Id.

139 Id. (relying on the purposes for involuntary medication stated in Harper).
140 Id.
141Id. at 2185-86.
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administration of drugs on other Harper-like grounds; and, if not, why
not. 142
The government did not contest the Eighth Circuit's decision that the
magistrate's finding of Sell's dangerousness was clearly erroneous, and the
143
majority therefore made the assumption that this decision was correct.
Based on this "hypothetical assumption" the Court found that the Eighth
Circuit's decision was incorrect in approving forced medication solely to
render Sell competent to stand trial. 144 The Court emphasized that the
magistrate based his order to medicate Sell on his dangerousness and that
the experts at the hearing focused on that aspect as well. 45 This failure to
focus on competency was found by the majority to potentially have made
an impact on the outcome of the hearing. 46 Thus, the Court held that the
present orders authorizing forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to
Sell could not stand. 147 They remanded the case and left open the option of
the government pursuing
forced medication on other grounds, including
48
Sell's dangerousness.
In addition, the Court found that the final judgment rule, normally
allowing appeals only after a final judgment is issued, did not apply in the
case because of the collateral order doctrine. 49 The judgment from which
Sell appealed was a pretrial order issued by the District Court. 50 The law
normally requires that a defendant wait until the end of the trial to appeal a
pretrial order.' 51 The jurisdictional statute governing this area authorizes
federal appellate courts to review the final decisions of the district courts. 152
However, the Court held, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,' 53 that a
preliminary decision is immediately appealable when it: "(1) conclusively
determines the question at issue; (2) resolves an important issue wholly

142

Id.

143Id.

(stating that the record actually suggests the contrary).
" Id.at 2187.
145 Id. (arguing that important questions concerning trial-related risks and competency
were not asked).
146 Id.
147 Id.

148Id. As of the date of publication, no decision has been issued by the District Court
concerning the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to Dr. Sell.
141Id. at
150Id. at

2183.
2182.

151 Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
113437 U.S. 463 (1978).
112
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separate from the merits of the 54
case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment."'
The Court found that the order conclusively determined the disputed
question, which was whether Sell had a legal right to refuse forced
medication. 5 The order also resolved an important issue separate from the
merits, namely that involuntary medical treatment raises important
questions of constitutional relevance with no relevance towards his guilt or
innocence.' 56 Finally, the Court found that the order was effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 57 By the time final
judgment had been entered, the harm Sell sought to avoid would already
have occurred. 5 8 The Court therefore concluded that the district court
order from which Sell appealed was a collateral order and both the Eighth
Circuit and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.' 59
B. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent, by Justice Scalia,160 focused solely on the jurisdictional
issue and found that the Eighth Circuit had no business entertaining Sell's
appeal.' 6' He would have vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision and
remanded with instructions to dismiss because the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction. 62 Justice Scalia lamented that the narrow exception allowing
for appeals on collateral orders was actually not met in the case. 63 He
relied on the final judgment rule 164 and found that the third requirement of
6
the collateral order doctrine was not met by the District Court's order.
Justice Scalia discussed that, in Riggins, the appeal refusing antipsychotic
medication came after the trial and, therefore, the majority was wrong to
conclude that an ordinary appeal of this issue came too late for a defendant
to enforce his right. 66 Justice Scalia narrowly interpreted the collateral
114

Id. at 468.

' Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2182.
Id.

156

157

Id.
Id.
"s9 Id. at 2183.
158

Joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas.
at 2188-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Sell's appeal was not an
interlocutory appeal as defined by the Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978)).
162 Id. at 2188 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
165Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160

161 Id
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order doctrine to cover only three types of prejudgment orders previously
67
recognized by the court, refusing to expand the doctrine in this case.,
Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's decision would allow
criminal defendants to engage in what he termed "opportunistic
behavior."' 68 This behavior would encourage a defendant to abruptly refuse
to take medication halfway through the trial and then appeal the order that
the medication continue involuntarily. 69 Justice Scalia argued that the
Court's decision created a "breathtaking expansion" of appellate
jurisdiction. 70 This expansion would thus allow a defendant to hold up a
trial for months and would constitute a disregard of the limits Congress
imposed on courts of appeals' jurisdiction.' 7 '
V. ANALYSIS

The Court in Sell failed to take the necessary steps to define an
individual's liberty interest in such a way as to preclude forced medication,
under any circumstances, of a criminal defendant awaiting trial solely to
render him competent to stand trial. The Court refused to build on the
framework defined in both Harper and Riggins. Instead, the majority set up
a very narrow test that a trial court must follow, but refused to go further
and state that the Constitution prohibits involuntary medication of a pretrial
detainee. The Court also seemed to advise trial courts to find the defendant
dangerous, or to find some other essential state interest, before attempting
to consider the competence issue.'
In so doing the Supreme Court failed
to prohibit the invasion of an individual's bodily integrity solely on the
grounds of trial competency. While the state has a legitimate interest in
bringing a defendant to trial, that interest is outweighed by the freedoms
granted by the United States Constitution to be free from unwanted bodily
intrusions.

67 Id. at 2190 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the three types of prejudgment orders

were: (1)denials of motions to reduce bail; (2) denials of motions to dismiss on doublejeopardy grounds; and (3) denials of motions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause).
68 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171Id. at 2190-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 This has been the case in at least one lower court decision, in which the case was
remanded to the trial court for determination of involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication on grounds other than competence, such as dangerousness. See State v. Jacobs,
828 A.2d 587 (Conn. 2003).
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A. THE INDIVIDUAL'S LIBERTY INTEREST TO BE FREE FROM
UNWANTED MEDICATION

An individual's constitutionally protected "liberty interest" to be free
from forcible medication has been recognized in all Supreme Court cases
dealing with the issue. 173 The Court in Harperstated that an individual has
a significant and constitutionally protected "liberty interest" in avoiding the
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. 74 In Riggins, the Court
found that the trial court's failure to consider the defendant's liberty interest
in being free from unwanted antipsychotic medication might have impaired
the constitutionally protected rights invoked by the defendant. 75 Though
the Court has split on when this liberty interest is outweighed by a
legitimate, important, and essential state interest-outweighed in Harper,
not outweighed in Riggins-the clear implication from the Court is that this
liberty interest will always outweigh the governmental interest of rendering
a defendant competent to stand trial.
1. ConstitutionalBasisfor an Individual'sLiberty Interest
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution specifically
provides that an individual in a criminal case may not be deprived of liberty
without due process of law.' 76 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the states from depriving any person of
liberty without due process of law. 77 This right to due process is split into
both procedural and substantive parts and courts have examined both of
these aspects of due process when dealing with the forced medication of an
178
individual.

Courts have explicitly recognized that a criminal defendant awaiting
trial has a substantive due process right to refuse the administering of
antipsychotic drugs. The Court in Riggins held that a pretrial detainee has a
constitutionally protected liberty (due process) interest to refuse unwanted
antipsychotic medication.1 79 In addition, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Gomes,' 80 found that a criminal defendant has a substantial interest
173 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990).
174 Harper,494 U.S. at 221.
17' Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.
176 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

177U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
178See Hakes, supra note 26.
179 504 U.S. at 135.

"S0 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002). Certiorari granted, judgment vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
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under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from
the bodily intrusion of forcible injection of antipsychotic drugs, given the
81
level of invasiveness and the seriousness of the possible side effects.'
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held, in Benson v. Terhune,182 that the
Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects an individual's right to be
free from unjustified bodily intrusions. 83 The court also added that this
liberty interest is heightened with antipsychotic drugs because of their
mind-altering properties.1 84 In sum, it is clear from the case law that courts
have repeatedly recognized a substantive due process right in criminal
defendants wanting to avoid involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication.
In addition to a substantive due process right, courts have recognized a
procedural due process right for criminal defendants that must be met in
order to involuntarily medicate them with antipsychotic drugs to render
them competent to stand trial.18 5 This procedural due process right was laid
out clearly in Sell. The Sell Court found that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment permits the government to involuntarily administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal
charges to render him competent to stand trial. 186 The test posited in Sell
assumed the government's right to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee but
laid out substantial limitations. 87 In so doing, the Court failed to recognize
that the substantive due process rights of an individual should actually
override the state's interest in rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial, regardless of whether the procedural due process rights were met or
not. The test the Court presented in Sell recognized the substantive liberty
interests of the individual in that it is a strict test and the circumstances
where it will be met "may be rare."' 88 In setting up such a strict test where
the requirements will rarely be met, the Court effectively blocked the
forcible medication of criminal defendants merely to render them
competent for trial, but failed to take the extra step and declare that an
individual's liberty interest in avoiding bodily intrusions outweighs any
state judicial interest.

Id. at 80.
182 304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002).

183
184

Id. at 884.
Id. at 881.

See Hakes, supra note 26.
186 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85.
187 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the majority's opinion).
188Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2184.

185
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While the Court in Harper authorized forcible medication of an
inmate,18 9 it was Justice Steven's dissent in Harper that addressed the
importance of an individual's liberty interest in light of the possibility of
forcible medication of anti-psychotic drugs. 9
He stated that every
violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of that person's
liberty.' 91 He further emphasized the invasion of an individual's liberty
when the intrusion involves a substantial risk of permanent injury and
premature death, as is the case with antipsychotic drugs. 192 Justice Stevens
also focused on the mind-altering properties of the drugs and on the fact
that this constituted a deprivation of liberty in "the most literal and
fundamental sense.' 93 Justice Stevens' dissent carries even more weight
when viewed in the context of Harper. Harper involved the forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill inmate. It can be
reasonably argued that an inmate's liberty interest is substantially less than
that of a pretrial detainee who is presumed innocent. Thus, Justice Stevens
was correct in concluding that "the liberty of citizens to resist the
administration
of mind altering drugs arises from our Nation's most basic
94
values."'
2. An Individual'sLiberty Interest Outweighs Any Governmental Interest
While the government has a substantial and legitimate interest in
bringing a defendant to trial, this interest will always be outweighed by an
individual's liberty interest to remain free from unwanted mind-altering
medication that has serious physical and mental side-effects. In reviewing
the government's interest, the trial court must first find that there is an
important governmental interest at stake. 95
It has been said that
"[c]onstitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to' 96
a
scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace."'
However, as the Sell Court stated, trial courts must consider the specific
189This note does not intend to show disagreement with the ruling in Harper. That case

dealt with a convicted inmate in the federal prison system and was decided on the grounds of
his dangerousness. Instead, this note focuses on the reasoning behind Justice Stevens'
dissent and how it applies to a pretrial detainee being forcibly medicated solely to render him
competent to stand trial.
'90 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).

SELL v. UNITED STATES

2004]

facts of the individual case when evaluating the government's interest in
bringing the accused to trial.' 97
The Court conceded that certain
98
of the government's interest.
importance
the
lessen
might
circumstances
The Court recognized that a defendant's failure to take drugs voluntarily
could result in a lengthy institutional confinement, which would diminish
the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing, without punishment, one who has
committed a serious crime. 99 Though the Court qualified the example, the
point nonetheless was made. 200 A mentally ill defendant found incompetent
to stand trial does not run free in society. There are strict guidelines and
regulations governing civil commitment, along with continuous treatment
and psychiatric review. 20 ' In light of these circumstances, it is clear that an
individual's liberty interest outweighs the governmental interest to bring a
criminal defendant to trial.
This point goes to the underlying rationale behind the test laid out in
Sell: in order to involuntary administer antipsychotic medication to a
criminal defendant the state must show that such medication is necessary to
further important government related trial-interests. 0 2 Again, Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion in Harper provides a clear analysis of the
balancing involved in authorizing forcible administration of antipsychotic
drugs to an individual. 0 3 While Justice Stevens' dissent did not deal with
trial-interests, it did examine the balancing of liberty interests with state
institutional concerns.20 4 He concluded that the majority allowed the
exaggerated response of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs
on the basis of purely institutional concerns, thus creating a "muddled
rationale. '20 5 While the state's interest in running a safe and secure
prison-and also in bringing a defendant to trial-is clearly both legitimate
and important, it is not clear that a violation of an individual's liberty
interest through forcible medication is necessary to further those
*206
interests.
In conclusion, an individual's liberty interest to avoid unwanted
administration of mind-altering drugs is deeply rooted in the Constitution.
197 123

S. Ct. at 2184.

198 Id.
199 Id.

200Id. (qualifying with the statement, "[w]e

do not mean to suggest that civil

commitment is a substitute for a criminal trial").
201 18 U.S.C.S. § 4247 (2003).
202

Id.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203
204
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Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that an individual not
be deprived of liberty through due process of law. An individual's bodily
integrity is a part of this liberty interest. While the government does have a
legitimate interest in bringing the accused to trial, this interest is not strong
enough to ignore an individual's right to avoid state-imposed medication
that will alter her mind and will.
B. AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IS UNDERMINED BY
INVOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATION
The right to a fair trial is a cornerstone of the justice system in the
United States. 207 A deedn
defendant's right to a fair and just trial becomes an
issue when the defendant's competency to stand trial is questioned.2 °8 A
defendant's right to a fair trial is jeopardized when antipsychotic medication
is administered involuntarily to a defendant solely to render him competent
to stand trial. As Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in
Riggins, medication with antipsychotic drugs creates a serious threat to a
defendant's right to a fair trial. 20 9 A defendant rendered competent through
chemistry is at a serious disadvantage, in that their ability to communicate
and assist in their defense is severely limited. The potential harmful side
effects of antipsychotic drugs puts the criminal defendant forcibly
medicated with such drugs at a serious disadvantage.
1.Competency
The Supreme Court first put forth a two-prong test for competency in
Dusky v. United States.2 1 ° In Dusky, the Court stated that two issues must
be examined: (1) whether the defendant has sufficient "present ability" to
confer with his lawyer to a reasonable degree in a way that allows for
rational understanding; and (2) whether the defendant "has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.",2 1' The
underlying policy of the Dusky test was to increase social respect for the
criminal justice system, ensuring that criminal punishment would only be

207 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Taylor v. United
States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam).
208 Sell v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2174 (2003).
209 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
211 Id. at 402.
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imposed on those who were aware of and could participate in the process.
Under the Dusky competence test, any impairment of an individual's ability
to function as a defendant, such as altered demeanor, would cause him or
her to be viewed as incompetent.21 3 Thus, competency became equated
with trial fairness, in that only a competent defendant would be able to
participate fully in her defense and ensure a just outcome.
In some circumstances, when an individual's trial incompetence is the
result of a mental illness, antipsychotic medication may be effective in
alleviating the symptoms of the illness and rendering the defendant
competent to stand trial.21 4 Antipsychotic drugs create competence by
altering the chemical balance in an individual's brain, which cause changes,
supposedly beneficial, in her cognitive processes.21 5 Restoration of
competence is often unlikely without antipsychotic medication, and the lack
of other effective alternatives could
mean a defendant may remain
21 6
incompetent to stand trial indefinitely.
2. The Harmful Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs Significantly Interfere
with a Defendant'sRight to a FairTrial
The ability of a defendant to actively participate in the trial, if she so
chooses, is a fundamental and constitutionally protected right of a criminal
defendant. The potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs can have a
significant impact on a defendant's right to a fair trial. 217 Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Riggins explored this issue in detail.21 8 In his view,
absent an extraordinary showing by the state, the Due Process Clause
prohibits the prosecution from forcibly administering antipsychotic drugs
for purposes of rendering the accused competent to stand trial. 21 9 These
212 Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand
Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1109, 1111

(1986).

213 M. Catherine Healy, Riggins v. Nevada: Are "Synthetically Sane" Criminal
Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 385,
402 (1994).
214 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 7, Sell (No. 025664).
215 Id. (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
216 Brief for the American Psychiatric Association at 25, Sell (No. 02-5664).
27 Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2187.
218 504 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Again, this Note does not
imply disagreement with the Court's outcome in Riggins. Its intent instead is to focus on
Justice Kennedy's concurrence and to highlight the policy concerns behind forcible
administration of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant solely for competency
purposes.
219 Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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elementary protections against state intrusion require that the state in every
case make a showing that there is no significant risk that the drugs would
impair or alter the defendant's ability to react to the testimony at trial or to
interact with his counsel on behalf of his defense.22 °
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs can significantly affect the
defendant's demeanor and cognitive functions during a trial. 21 Justice
Kennedy found that these drugs could prejudice a defendant in two possible
ways. First, they could alter his or her demeanor in a manner that would
prejudice his or her reactions in the courtroom, and second, the drugs could
render him or her unable and unwilling to effectively assist counsel in the
defense.2 22 Antipsychotic drugs could interfere with important aspects of
the trial. They could sedate the defendant, interfere with communication
with counsel, prevent rapid reaction and response to the proceedings, and
also prevent the demonstration of emotions such as remorse or
compassion.22 3 Justice Kennedy concluded that the documented probability
of side effects would render involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs "unacceptable" unless the State were able to show that the drugs
would not alter the defendant's demeanor or reduce his ability to assist in
his defense.224
The Court in Sell, while recognizing the effect of antipsychotic drugs
on a defendant's demeanor and cognitive abilities, failed to find that these
side effects were significant enough to always hinder a defendant's right to
a fair trial. 22 5 This terse dismissal of the side effects of antipsychotic drugs
is one of the major flaws with the Court's opinion. It was unwilling to take
the extra, bold step necessary to bring the law in line with medicine. These
drugs are not perfect and have serious consequences that significantly
undermine a defendant's right to a fair trial. The American Psychiatric
Association stated in Riggins:
By administering medication, the State may be creating a prejudicial negative
demeanor in the defendant-making him look nervous, restless . . . or so calm or

220Id. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

221Id. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae American
Psychological Association at 15, Sell (No. 02-5664).
223Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-143 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224 Id. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 123 S. Ct. at 2187 (explaining that "[w]e cannot tell whether the side effects of
antipsychotic medication were likely to undermine the fairness of a trial in Sell's case").
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sedated as to appear bored, cold, unfeeling, and unresponsive .... That226such effects
may be subtle does not make them any less real or potentially influential.

The fact that the medical community recognizes such a prejudice should
serve as a clear announcement to the Court that antipsychotic medication is
unpredictable and complex and consequently should not be relied on to
create the perfect, competent defendant.
Justice Kennedy pointed out in Riggins that there existed a difference
between competency to stand trial and the purpose of involuntary
medication in Harper, which was to halt the dangerousness of an
incarcerated individual to himself and others.227 In Sell, the Court did not
examine the dangerousness issue as it was not on appeal before them.
However, the Court made strong overtures that a trial court should focus on
dangerousness when considering involuntary medication of a defendant, 228
as
evidenced by its strict standard for medicating solely for competence.
The Court was hedging its bets when it should have come out forcefully
with a prohibition on forcible medication of a mentally ill defendant solely
to make him competent for trial.
In sum, an individual has a constitutionally protected right to a fair
trial. An individual's competency is an essential aspect of this right.
Consequently, if the state compels the individual to involuntarily take
antipsychotic medication it is significantly hindering the ability of a
defendant to assist in his or her defense and thus have a fair trial. And as
the Court in Sell stated, "the Government has a concomitant,
constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant's trial is a
fair one., 229 As such, the Court in Sell did take a significant step in
solidifying the defendant's right to a fair trial, but missed an opportunity to
transform Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins into the law of the
United States. Justice Kennedy's belief-that a state's interest in bringing a
competent defendant to trial will most likely never be compelling enough to
overcome the defendant's right to a fair trial, given the substantial side
effects of antipsychotic drugs-was tailor made for the issues presented in
Sell. In failing to adopt a standard prohibiting forcible medication of a
mentally ill defendant with antipsychotic drugs for the sole purpose of
rendering him competent to stand trial, the Court missed an opportunity to
align this area soundly with the Constitution.
226 Brief for American Psychiatric Association at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127
(1992) (No. 90-8466). But see Brief for the American Psychiatric Association, Sell (No. 025664) (giving an alternative conclusion to the effects of antipsychotic medication).
2" 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
228 123 S. Ct. at 2187.
229

Id. at 2184.
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C. THE COURT EXTENDED ITS STANDARD OF SERIOUSNESS OF THE
CRIME TOO FAR
The test laid out by the Court in Sell allowed the government to
involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant
facing serious criminal charges. ° If one admits that the Court was correct
in formulating such a test, there still remains the glaring issue of whether
Sell's alleged crimes were serious. The Court stated that the Government's
interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime was
important.23 This important interest remained whether the offense was a
serious crime against a person or a serious crime against property. 232 While
admittedly there might be some circumstances where there is a serious
crime against property, it seems that these circumstances would be rare and
would most certainly not be serious enough to override an individual's
liberty interest along with a defendant's right to a fair trial.
The sentencing guidelines for crimes against property could provide a
solid bright line test as to whether the crime reaches the level of serious.
The Court should have defined this line and clearly stated that based on the
sentencing guidelines, crimes of fraud do not reach the level of seriousness
that would allow for a violation of an individual's liberty interest. 233 It is
clear that Sell's individual liberty interest to be free from unwanted
medication greatly outweighed the State's interest in prosecuting him for
fraud and money-laundering. 234 The sentencing guidelines for such crimes
are monetary-based and as such should not lead to a deprivation of a
235
defendant's liberty interest.
The above facts clearly distinguish Sell from Riggins, a case in which
the defendant was accused of murder. 6 It can be legitimately argued that
the State has a strong and essential interest in bringing an accused murderer
to trial. Murder is a crime with a clear victim and one that has historically
been recognized as the most heihous offense committed by persons.
However, when the crime is one solely involving property, that essential
interest lessens and the individual's liberty interest cannot be ignored. An
individual's right to bodily integrity and to be free from intrusion is a sacred
230 Id. at 2185.
231 Id.
232 Id.

233 United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) (Bye, J., dissenting) (stating
that based on the money involved in the alleged crimes, Dr. Sell would serve somewhere in
the range of thirty-three to forty-one months).
234 Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 573 (Bye, J., dissenting).
236 504 U.S.

127 (1992).
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right and crimes such as wire fraud and money-laundering, which are
crimes that need to be punished, do not warrant pushing aside that right.
An individual should not be forced to take antipsychotic drugs in order to
be prosecuted for such crimes. 237 The possible debilitating and life-long
side effects, along with the impairing of a right to a fair trial, do not justify
the forcible medication of an individual to further the state's interest.238
In conclusion, it was error for the Court in Sell to use the seriousness
of the crimes in Riggins as a basis for the test used in Sell. Although the
Court refused to uphold the authorization of antipsychotic drugs in both
cases, it set out a dangerous precedent. Theoretically, an individual could
be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs to become competent to
stand trial for nonviolent crimes involving such limited punishment as
thirty-three months in prison. 239 The "seriousness of the crime standard"
laid out by the Court in Sell significantly curtails the liberty interest of an
individual to be free from any unwanted bodily intrusion and deprives a
defendant of a right to a fair trial.
D. THE DISSENT AND THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
The main point of the dissent, written by Justice Scalia,24 ° was that an
order authorizing involuntary medication of antipsychotic drugs is not
appealable, as a collateral order.24 ' Justice Scalia relied on the final
judgment rule which states that only final judgments by the trial court are
appealable.24 2 However, the collateral order doctrine, first formulated by
the Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, allows for certain appeals prior
to the final judgment. 243 As stated above, the collateral order doctrine
allows appeals prior to a final judgment if they concern orders that (1)
conclusively determine the matter in dispute, (2) resolve an important issue
wholly separate from the issue of the case, and (3) are effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. 244 While the majority found
Justice Scalia found
that the District Court's order met these requirements,
245
that it failed the third requirement of the doctrine.

237 Sell, 282 F.3d at 574 (Bye, J., dissenting).
238 For a list of the side-effects of antipsychotic medication, see supra Part II-A.
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Consequently, Justice Scalia would have such an order heard on appeal
only after a final judgment (guilt or innocence) was made.24 6 Justice Scalia
relied on the decision in Riggins, in which an order authorizing forcible
medication of antipsychotic drugs was appealed after the case, as
demonstrating the allowance of such an appeal after conviction and
sentencing. 247 He argued that the majority in Sell was "wrong" to say that
an appeal of such an order comes too late for the defendant to enforce his
right to-be free of unwanted mind-altering medication.24 8 He conceded that
the defendant would not get the type of remedy sought, but he did not
explain exactly what type of remedy the defendant would receive.2 49 In
doing so, Justice Scalia completely ignored the reality of the third prong of
the collateral doctrine. The majority got it right by concluding that an
appeal comes too late for the defendant wishing to refuse antipsychotic
medication. 25 0 Not only did Justice Scalia ignore the black letter law but he
refused to recognize an individual's liberty interest to be free from forced
medication by the state. 1 As stated above, the Constitution and numerous
court decisions have recognized this right and it has been strictly enforced.
Justice Scalia was so worried about the "invented" narrow exception to the
final decision rule that he ignored the fact that the defendant would already
have been harmed, possibly irreparably, by the time Justice Scalia would
allow such an appeal.2
Similarly, Justice Scalia feared the broad repercussions that would
result from the Court's holding. 253 He was concerned that a defendant
would voluntarily take the medication until halfway through the trial and
then cease, abruptly demanding an interlocutory appeal. 4 This reasoning
completely ignores any liberty interest a defendant may have. Justice Scalia
was so afraid of the disruption of the judicial system that he failed to
recognize that the criminal defendant has rights and is presumed innocent.
His logic seemed to rest on the assumption that a defendant has reduced
rights. While it can be argued that a convicted inmate might have reduced
liberty interests, as found in Harper, this in no way should extend to a
pretrial detainee.
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Justice Scalia also was deeply concerned that the majority's ruling
would create a "breathtaking expansion" of appellate jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders.255 Justice Scalia believed that any criminal defendant
who asserts that a trial order would cause an immediate violation of his
constitutional rights could immediately appeal.256 However, as the majority
noted, the considerations of the severity of the intrusion and the importance
of the constitutional issue involved, distinguished Sell's case from Justice
Scalia's examples.257 The Court was correct in dismissing Justice Scalia's
argument in one sentence. His "the sky is falling" approach to judicial
economy completely ignored the important constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant. If Justice Scalia were to have his way a defendant
could only challenge the order forcibly medicating him after he had been
medicated and possibly irreparably harmed, both during trial and after, by
their serious side effects. This reasoning completely ignores both the
collateral order doctrine and the fundamental principle of liberty embodied
in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Sell held that a mentally ill criminal defendant facing
serious criminal charges could be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to
have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking
into account less intrusive alternatives, is significantly necessary to further
important governmental trial-related interests. 258 While the Court made
strong overtures that it would be unlikely that a lower court would ever be
able to meet the strict standard set forth in its decision, it failed to take the
extra step and prohibit forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs solely
to render a defendant competent to stand trial.
Every individual has a constitutionally based liberty interest in being
free from unwanted bodily intrusions. This liberty interest will always
outweigh the State's interest in bringing a defendant to trial. In addition,
every criminal defendant has a constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair
trial. When a defendant is forcibly medicated to become competent to stand
trial this right is severely jeopardized because of the harmful side effects of
antipsychotic drugs. Finally, the dissent completely ignored the black letter
law of the final judgment rule and the collateral order doctrine, along with

255 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ignoring any rights a criminal defendant may have in favor of judicial
economy.
In sum, the Court in Sell set up a strict standard but should have held
that forcible medication of a mentally ill defendant solely to render him or
her competent to stand trial would always violate her liberty interest and
deprive the defendant of a right to a fair trial.
John R. Hayes

